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THE NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR NO-FAULT INSURANCE
ACT: GOOD INTENTIONS AND BAD FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION

The elmination of the fault principle in automobile accident reparations has proceeded apace. By June 1, 1975, the legislature of each
state had considered and twenty-four states had enacted no-fault laws
under which victims or their representatives are compensated for injuries received in automobile accidents without regard to the fault or
negligence of another party.1 Under the no-fault system, transactional
costs incurred in proving neglience together with the losses incurred
by persons who settle claims for less than the amount of their economic losses are avoided. To achieve this objective, no-fault laws generally provide for payment of restoration costs (e.g., medical and rehabilitation services, loss of income, loss of services) to victims of automobile accidents and compensation of the representatives of persons
killed in automobile accidents while at the same time greatly curtailing
the right to sue in tort.2
The involvement of the federal government in no-fault legislation began with a joint resolution sponsored by Senators Magnuson
and Moss which was enacted as Public Law 90-3133 commissioning a
study of the existing motor vehicle accident compensation systems by
the Department of Transportation and appropriating $2,000,000 therefor. The study filled 24 volumes and concluded not only that the fault
1. S. R P. No. 283, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as S. REP.

No. 283]. The concept of no-fault insurance is not old. A no-fault law was first enacted
in Saskatchewan in 1946 and continues in effect today. The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1946, Statutes of the Province of Saskatchewan 1946, ch. 11, codified at
Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, N.Y. INS. ch. 409 (Can. 1965). In1970 Massachusetts
became the first state to enact a no-fault law. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A, D,

M, N (Supp. 1972); id. ch. 175, §§ 22E-H, 113B-C; id. ch. 231, § 61). Professor Keeton,
who, together with Professor O'Connell, proposed the basic no-fault plan in 1964, indicates that only 14 of the 24 no-fault laws currently in effect are "true no-fault legislation" by which he means "legislation that does have a tort exemption provision of
some kind." Hearings on H. Con. Res. 116, H.R. 10, H.R. 1400, H.R. 1680, H.R.
2162, H.R. 13714, H.R. 15789, and S. 354 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 404 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Hearings].
2. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 670 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1975). The
New York plan allows suits to be maintained in cases where injuries result in death,
dismemberment, significant disfigurement, compound or comminuted fractures, permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system, or where medical
services exceed $500. Id. §§ 671(4), 673(1).
3. Act of May 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-313, 82 Stat. 126.
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system was costly, inefficient and slow but also that it allocates benefits
poorly and overburdens the courts and legal system. 4 Thereafter, the
Congress carefully considered several no-fault bills, and, although S.
354, probably the most popular measure, was approved by the Senate
in the 93d Congress by vote of 53 to 42, no bill has been approved by
both houses to date and no-fault at the federal level continues to meet
with substantial opposition. 5 In part, resistance has come from those
quarters which have opposed no-fault legislation at the state level, but
more significantly, both the Nixon and Ford Administrations as well as
many state officials have argued against no-fault at the federal level for
the reasons that the experience with no-fault is tentative and inconclusive and that the divergent tort and insurance-law needs of the states
require state legislative solutions. 6 In addition, the historic role of the
4.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR

(1971).
5. A federal no-fault bill was introduced by Senators Magnuson and Hart of Michigan in 1971. S. 945, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Committee on Commerce reported
favorably. 118 CONG. REC. 21628 (1972); S. REP. No. 891, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). Thereafter, however, the membership of the Senate voted to rcfer the bill to
the Committee on the Judiciary. 118 CONG. REc. 27306 (1972). That Committee took
no action on the bill and adjourned sine die. In 1973 the National No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance Act was introduced. S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter
cited as the 1974 bill]. The Committee on Commerce held hearings over ten days.
See Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. 1 & 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings]. Thereafter, that committee again reported favorably. 119 CONG. REC. S15568 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1973);
COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 100

S. REP. No. 382, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)

[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 382].

The Committee on the Judiciary also held hearings. See Hearings on S. 354 Before the
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited
as the 1974 Senate Hearings]. That committee then reported favorably on the bill.
120 CONG. REC. S4494 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1974); S. REP. No. 757, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974)

[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 757]. The bill was passed by the full

Senate by vote of 53 to 42. 120 CONG. REC. S6696 (daily ed. May 1, 1974). However,
the 93d Congress took no further action on the bill before its adjournment. The bill
was reintroduced by the Senate into the 94th Congress by Senator Magnuson. See S. 354,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 354 or the 1975 bill]. Five days
of hearings were held by the Committee on Commerce. See Hearings Before the Comm.

on Commerce on S. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Senate Hearings]. After the submission of amendment No. 497 by Senator Stevens, the
National Standards for No-Fault Insurance Act was reported favorably, with Senator
Buckley alone dissenting. 121 CONG. REo. S12558 (daily ed. July 15, 1975); S. REP.
No. 283, at 175 (minority views of Mr. Buckley).
The House of Representatives has considered spveral bills and held extensive hearings but has neither reported favorably nor approved any bill to date. See 1974 House
Hearings, pts. 1 & 2; id. pt. 1, at 3-347, wherein the following are reprinted: H.R. 10,
H.R. 358, H.R. 1400, H.R. 1680, H.R. 2162, H.R. 4023, H.R. 13714, H.R. 13777,
H.R. 15789 and S. 354. See also H.R. 1272, H.R. 1900, H.R. 7985, H.R. 8441, H.R.
9650, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
6. See, e.g., Testimony of Karl Hermann, Commissioner of Insurance, State of
Washington, 1974 Senate Hearings 401 (opposing no-fault at the federal level); letter

from John A. Volpe to Sen. Norris Cotton, Jan. 19, 1973, 1973 Senate Hearings, pt.
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states in regulating the business of insurance has been advanced *as a
'legal and practical justification for the Congress' deferring to the states
in the enactement of no-fault legislation, but it should be noted that
the authority of Congress to regulate the business of insurance cannot
fairly be questioned.7
S. 354, the National Standards for No-Fault Insurance Act, represents an attempt on the part of the Congress to remedy the inequities
and inefficiencies of the fault system of automobile accident reparations,
while deferring, to the extent possible, to the prerogatives of individual
states and at the same time formulating national standards which must
be met or exceeded by the states. Because S. 354 is a novel attempt to
-steer a course between the Scylla and Charybdis of federal-state relations, it has attracted much attention, some of it highly critical, insofar
as it attempts to deal with a problem of national scope on the national
level while reserving to the states the responsibility for both implementing the law and making adjustments to state law consonant with
the needs of the individual states.8 This paper will first address the
underlying authority of the Congress to enact a federal no-fault law
generally and S. 354 in particular. Second, it will consider the tenth
amendment objections that have been made against the bill and- the
interests of federalism involved in the complex workings of the bill. It
1, at 59-60 (stating the position of the Nixon Administration in opposition to federal
no-fault legislation); Statement of William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary of Transportation,
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, May 5, 1975, S. REP. No. 283, at 128
(same position taken by the Ford Administration). Governor Meldrim Thomson Jr.
of New Hampshire argued against federal no-fault on the ground that national insurance needs differ greatly from the needs of a predominantly rural state. Testimony of
Meldrim Thomson Jr., 1974 Senate Hearings 1023-24. Another critic pointed to disagreement concerning the best no-fault plan as grounds for implementing no-fault at
the state level. Testimony of Sherman Bernard, Commissioner of Insurance, State of
Louisiana, 1974 Senate Hearings 644-45. See also Dorsen, The National No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 45, 63-64
(1974) ("It would seem . . . that this is a splendid occasion to follow the counsel of
Justice Brandeis and permit the various states to serve as 'laboratories' to 'try novel
social and economic experiments witliout risk to the rest of the country.' " Id. at 63).
But see note 99 infra & accompanying text.
At least one proponent of no-fault legislation conceives of the congressional -attention to the problem as a stick (or carrot) for the purpose of encouraging action on the
part of individual states. Letter from John A. Volpe to Sen. Norris Cotton, 1973
Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 59. See also Moss, The Fault with Nixonian No-Fault, 1975
Senate Hearings 622: "the Nixon Administration began in early 1972 to threaten the
States with Federal action if they did not move in the area of no-fault automobile insurance reform." But cf. Editorial, A Reasonable Approach to No-Fault, The Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1975, at A8, col. 1, wherein the enactment of S. 354 is supported.
7. Statement of Dr. Mitchell Wendell, 1974 Senate Hearings 215.
8. Dorsen, supra note 6 passim; Statement of Dr. Mitchell Wendell, supra note
7; Statement of Thomas C. Matthews, Jr., 1974 Senate Hearings 652-707.
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will not attempt to address questions of tort law and policy which have
been raised and discussed elsewhere, 9 or the constitutional due process
and equal protection arguments which have been made against the
bill. 10 S. 354 is a complicated bill and will, if enacted, require legislation on the part of all the states."
I.

STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS OF S.

354

S. 354 sets forth standards of tort and insurance law which are expected to be met by legislation at the state level.' 2 For states which fail
to enact such legislation, an Alternative Federal No-Fault Plan has
been provided. 13 The proposed act achieves this result by establishing
so-called Title II and Title III plans which denominate respectively
those plans effected by voluntary state action and those plans which
would go into effect upon the failure of the state to act. Title I of the
Act includes the requisite findings of Congress.' 4 They are illuminat9. Dorsen, supra note 6, articles and symposia collected at 46 n.4.
10. See, e.g., Griswold, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act S. 354, 1974 Senate Hearings 770-88.
11. See Statement of Robert E. Keeton, 1974 House Hearings, pt. 1, at 403.
12. S. REP. No. 382 at 1.
13. S. 354 §§ 301-04 [references except as noted are to the 1975 bill).
14. The Congress finds that(1) Motor vehicles are the primary instrumentality for the transportation
of individuals within the United States. The transportation of individuals by
motor vehicle over Federal-aid highways and other highways and roadways
occurs in, or affects, interstate commerce.
(2) The maximum feasible restoration of individuals injured, and compensation for the economic losses of the survivors of individuals killed, in the
course of such transportation, are necessary and proper for the protection
and advancement of commerce and a suitable and desirable concomitant to
the establishment of post roads and the expenditure of moneys therefor.
(3) Documented studies and almost a century of experience demonstrate
that the prevailing system of motor vehicle accident and insurance law in the
United States is inefficient, overly costly, incomplete, slow, allocates benefits
poorly, discourages rehabilitation, overburdens the courts, does little if anything
to minimize crash losses, and, accordingly, constitutes an undue burden on
commerce. The prevailing system makes compensation of a victim contingent
upon(A) the victim first showing that someone else was at fault;
(B) the victim first showing that he was without fault or less
at fault;
(C) a lawsuit, whenever these showings or others are in dispute;
and
(D) the party at fault having sufficient liability insurance or
other financial resources to pay for the victim's losses.
(4) A low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system for the restoration and
compensation of victims would eliminate such undue burden on commerce.
(5) Research and the experience in a number of jurisdictions have
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ing in that they reveal the congressional perception of the deficiencies
of the present fault system, the source of constitutional authority for
the Congress to deal with the problem and the specific finding that
"[d]irect Federal Government action" is not required to implement the
national no-fault standards. Also included in Title I are the declared
purposes of the Act,15 and sections dealing with the requirement and
availability of insurance, the manner in which no-fault benefits, attorney's fees and assigned claims will be compensated, the responsibilities of the state in regulating insurance and other housekeeping provisions. Title II establishes the National Standards, which are defined
to include the provisions of Titles I and II. Title II establishes the criteria for a state plan in accordance with national standards, pre-empts,
so far as inconsistent, provisions of state law which would prevent
the adoption or implementation of a state no-fault plan and the various requirements of tort and insurance law. Title III, the Alternative
Federal No-Fault Plan, adopts the provisions of Titles I and II with the
demonstrated that a system of motor vehicle accident and insurance law that(A) assures victims prompt payment of all their medical and rehabilitation costs, recovery of most of their work loss, and compensation for a reasonable amount of replacement services and survivor's
loss; and
(B) eliminates the need to determine fault, except in cases
involving very serious injuries,
is such a low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system. The establishment of such
a no-fault system nationwide, in place of the system described in paragraph
(3), would remove an undue burden on commerce.
(6) The Federal Government is authorized to establish and maintain,
directly or indirectly, such a nationwide no-fault system, pursuant to the constitutional powers vested in Congress "To regulate Commerce . . .among the
several States" and "To establish... post Roads."
(7) Direct Federal Government action is neither necessary nor desirable
for this purpose. The uniformity that is necessary among all the States as to
the essential elements of such a system can be achieved by Congress by the
establishment of national standards for State no-fault plans for motor vehicle
insurance and a mechanism for assuring compliance with such standards.
id. § 102(a).
15.
It is hereby declared to be the purpose of the Congress in this Act(1) to establish nationwide, at reasonable cost to consumers, a comprehensive and fair system that will provide the maximum feasible restoration for
victims of motor vehicle accidents and compensation for the survivors of such
victims;
(2) to establish national standards for State no-fault plans for motor
vehicle insurance and a mechanism for assuring compliance with such standards; and
(3) to recognize, respect, and avoid interfering with the historical role
of the States in exercising legislative authority over, and in determining the
manner of regulation of, the business of insurance.

Id. § 102(b).
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exception -of provisions in which multiple courses of action are 'available to the states. Under the Title III plan, such choices are not aivailable since Title III states are those which have not enacted an ,cceptable no-fault law.
A. .State Plans-NationalStandards
'A state desiring to adopt a state no-fault plan (a state law which'is
in 'accordance with the National Standards set forth in Title II) Ts
empowered to do so, at any time, by the Act.' 0 Provisions of state law,
arising under the state constitution or otherwise, which Would prevent
the adoption or' implementation of a Title II plan would be prieempted.17 Such a plan would require that every person owning a mt6r
Vehicle registered'in the state must continuously provide and maintain
s~durity covering the motor vehicle.' The state Commissioner of Insurance (or other person, agency, etc., charged with the supervision and
irgulation of the business of insurance in the state, hereinafter the Commissioner) must establish and implement, or approve and supervise,
a plan to insure that security to cover basic restoration benefits and
other benefits required by section 104 of the Act is conveniently and
practically available to each owner of a motor vehicle registered in the
state.19 Insurers may consult and agree with each other, subject to the
supervision and approval of the Commissioner, "as to the rates, terms,
16. Id. § 202(b). The section is probably superfluous except in those cases where
a Title III plan had gone into effect, at which time the question could arise whether
pre-emption by the federal government had been called for, with the result that a
state would be prevented from enacting any law inconsistent with a Title III plan.
By section 202(b), a state could enact a Title II plan after a Title III plan had gone
into effect, and the state would thus be permitted the latitude of enactment given to
Title II states.
'17. Id. § '202(a).

18. Id. § 104(a).
19. In so many words, the plan:

. (1)' must provide security to persons upon payment of the premium and

proof of a license to operate a motor vehicle, and must provide for charges

not unfairly discriminatory for such premiums;
(2) may provide for the assignment of applicants among insurers by a
pooling or other reinsurance arrangement;
(3) must make available to such applicants other insurance such as added
restoration benefits (discussed at note 24 infra & accompanying text) which
the Commissioner determines to be reasonably needed and is generally provided in the market;
(4) must make available provisions for the financing of premiums;
(5) must require all insurers writing insurance in the state to participate
in. the assigned claims plan and must provide for the apportionment of

financial burdens arising from the plan and the costs of maintaining such a
plan among insurers.
See Id. §§ 105(a)(1)-(a)(6).
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and rate modifications" for insurance provided by the plan.20 The Commissioner is given rulemaking and other necessary authority.2 1
., The state plan must provide for the compensation, without limitation, for medical expenses and the like of persons injured in an automobile accident without regard to the fault of the person claiming
benefits. Items of medical expense are nominated "allowable expense"
by the statute. Allowable expense, however, does not include benefits
for damage to property unless the state so provides. In order to avoid
duplication of payment for injuries or lost income, the amount to be
recovered as first-party benefits is diminished to reflect sums received
2
from other compensation sources such as workmen's compensation.;
The state plan must similarly provide for the compensation of wages
lost due to an injury-producing accident, although the state may place
limits on the recovery permitted. The plan must provide for the compensation of "replacement services loss" (e.g., the cost of hiring a cook
during the period that the person who usually performs such services
20. Id. § 105(a) (6).
21. Id.

22. A "restoration obligor" is the insurer who provides "security covering-a motor
vehicle." Id. § 103(25). The "restoration obligor" is required to pay "basic restoration
benefits" without regard to the fault of the person entitled to payment. Id. § 111(b).
"Basic restoration benefits" include items of "loss," less compensation received from
other sources, such as workmen's compensation, etc. Id. §§ 103(4), 208(a). "Basic
restoration benefits" are payable to "victims' who suffer "loss." Id. § 103(4). "Victim"
means "an individual who suffers loss as a result of an accident." Id. § 103(39). See id.
§--103(1) for the definition of accident, and id. §§ 103(18),(16) for the definitions of
'motor vehicle" and "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" therein implicated.
"Loss' is defined to include items of "allowable expense." Id. § 103(14). This 'term
includes charges for "professional medical treatment and care" (which term is not
defined), "emergency medical services" (defined at id. § 103(8)), and "medical arid
vocational rehabilitation services" (defined at id. § 103(17)). Id. § 103(3). These dial
6ther no-fault benefits are payable when the loss accrues, as opposed to when injury
occurs. Id. § 106(a). The state plan may not limit the amount payable as items of
allowable expense. Id. § 204(a). Although the definition of "loss" (id. § 103(14))
Aithin which an item of expense must be included so as to be payable as an element
of "basic restoration benefits" does not include loss from damage to-property, the state
is permitted to include such damages directly within "basic restoration benefits" if it
so desires. Id. § 103(4).
The determination of which "restoration obligor" is required to make payment to
i'victim is made under section 205(a) entitled "Priorities." The first recourse is against
the victim's employer if the injury occurs while the victim, his spouse or other specified
telative is driving or occupying an automobile furnished by the employer. Second, the
victim may recover from the person providing the security under which the victim is
insured. See the definition of "insured" at id. § 103(12). Third, the victim may recci€ier from the person providing security covering the motor vehicle involved in the
bAccident if the victim was an occupant of the motor vehicle and not himself insured.
"Seturity covering a motor vehicle" is that security required under the mandatory insurance provision of section 104. Lastly, the victim may recover under an assigaed
claims plan. See note 26 infra & accompanying text. Provision is made for untangling
of liabilities where multiple sources of equal priority exist. S. 354 § 205(b).
" "
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is unable to do so) and "survivor's loss" or losses due to the death of
a victim of an automobile accident.23
The Act provides for two additional types of coverage, one which
insurers may offer, subject to the approval of terms and forms of insurance by the Commissioner, the other including coverage which, insurers must offer. Consumers, however, are not required to purchase
either. The "optional offering" consists of coverage for benefits excluded by limits on work loss, replacement services loss and survivor's
loss as well as insurance for property damage and benefits for the loss
of use of a motor vehicle. Coverage which insurers must offer, "mandatory offerings," includes insurance for damage to a motor vehicle (commonly known as "collision insurance"), insurance for the payment of
tort liability (unless the state determines that coverage for tort liability
is required motor-vehicle insurance which all owners of motor vehicles must provide pursuant to section 104(a)). Because motorcycles
do not fall within the no-fault plan unless the state so provides, mandatory offerings also require that insurers offer coverage for basic restoration benefits to motorcycle owners. 24 The state plan is required to provide for the partial abolition of tort liability, with suits maintainable
only in certain limited instances. 25
23. Lost wages fall within the definition of "work loss." S. 354 § 103(41). "Work

loss," which is defined as "loss of income," means gross income that the victim would

have lost but for any wage continuation plan, reduced by income received for per-

forming substitute work or income which the victim could reasonably have earned but
did not. Id. § 103(15). Any tax saving which accrues through the nontaxability of
no-fault benefits is likewise subtracted from work loss. Id. § 208(b). Gross income is

determined by a variety of formulae which apply to persons regularly employed, seasonally employed or not employed. Id. §§ 207(a)-(c). The state plan is permitted to
limit work loss recovery within certain bounds. Id. § 204(b). "Work loss," "replace-

ment services loss" (defined at id. § 103(26)), and "survivor's loss" (defined at i. §
103(37)) are all elements of "loss" (id. § 103(14)) and become payable as set out

at note 22 supra. The state plan "may provide reasonable exclusions from or . . .
limitations on basic restoration benefits for replacement services loss." Id. § 204(c).
The Commerce Committee in its section-by-section analysis said the following con-

cerning the limitation:
The Committee does not intend that a State could totally deny such benefits

....
Elimination would not be a "reasonable" exclusion.
S. RzP. No. 382, at 63. Reasonable exclusions or limitations may also be placed upon

"survivor's loss." S. 354 § 204(d).

24. S. 354 §§ 210(a),(b). Provision for offering basic restoration benefits to

motorcycle owners under section 201(b) (D) as "added restoration benefits" is necessary

because states are free to exclude motorcycles from the definition of "motor vehicles."
rd. § 103(18). Since only "motor vehicles" as defined may be involved in "accidents"

as defined in section 103(1), a motorcycle rider who is injured in a mishap is not a
"victim" within section 103(39) eligible to recover basic restoration benefits under
section 103(4).
25. The Act, in so many words, provides for the abolition of all tort liability
except in those instances where:
(1) the vehicle involved in an accident is not secured, in which case the
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Other provsions relating to the manner and extent of payment
of basic restoration benefits and added restoration benefits will be described briefly. An assigned claims bureau, which would administer the
compensaton of certain claimants unable to collect basic restoration
benefits for specified reasons, must be established if one does not presently exist. 26 The Commissioner is required to regulate and disseminate

information regarding rates charged by restoration obligors for security,
evaluate and supervise emergency medical services and vocational rehabilitation services for which reimbursement is paid by restoration
obligors as an item of allowable expense, and approve terms and forms
of insuranceY7
A state no-fault plan is deemed to be in accordance with the national standards if such a plan "meets or exceeds" each of the national standards and contains no provisions inconsistent, in whole or
in part, with the national standards.2 8 The Act establishes a "Review
Board," an independent instrumentality within the Department of
Transportation, and it is this body, which, upon certification to it by
owner remains liable; (2) injuries arising out of a defect in a motor vehicle
are caused or not corrected by persons engaged in designing, manufacturing, repairing or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles; (3) a person is injured by
conduct intended to cause injuries; (4) certain losses exceed amounts compensated under state plans; (5) injuries result in death, serious and permanent disfigurement, or other serious and permanent injury, or more than 90
days continuous or total disability; (6) an act or omission not connected with
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle (e.g., creation of a roadside
hazard) causes injury.
See id. §§ 206(a) (1)-(a) (5).
26. Id. § 108(b). The assigned claims bureau may be organized either by restoration obligors providing insurance within the state, subject to the approval and regulation by the Commissioner, or, if the bureau is not organized and maintained as required
by the Act, the Commissioner is directed to organize and maintain such a plan himself.
The compensation of claimants under the system of "priorities" (id. § 205(a); see
note 22 supra) allows recourse to the assigned claims plan only after all other sources
of compensation are found inapplicable or the obligor is unable to pay for other reasons
set forth in section 108(a).
27. Id. §§ 109(a),(b),(c), 212(b).
28. (1)
A State no-fault plan for motor vehicle
insurance is in accordance
with national standards only if such a plan includes provisions which meet or
exceed each of the national standards, pursuant to paragraph (2), and if such
plan does not include any provisions that are inconsistent, in whole or in part,
with the national standards.
(2) . . . A provision in a State no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance

"meets" a national standard if its substance is the same as, or the equivalent
of, the national standard which corresponds to it. A provision in such a State
plan "exceeds" a national standard if its substance is more favorable or beneficial, with respect to insureds, victims, or survivors, than the national standard
which corresponds to it, or if it is more restrictive of tort liability than the
national standard established by section 206(a).

Id. § 201(b).
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the chief executive officer of a state that a no-fault plan in accordance
with the national standards has been enacted, determines whether
the state plan is in accordance with the national standards. 29 Presumably, if the Review Board determines that the state plan is in accordance
with the national standards, the law would thereupon go into effect in
that state. 30 The Act also provides for periodic recertification of state
plans and for requests by the Board to the chief executive officer of
each state for which a certification pursuant to section 202(c) is on file
for reports "evaluating the successs of such State's no-fault plan for
motor vehicle insurance in terms of such State's contribution to the
purposes of Congress set forth in section 102(b)." These reports are to
reflect various concerns of Congress (e.g., cost of insurance, court congestion, etc.) and lay the basis for annual reports which the Board is
required to make to the President and Congress.3 1
The Alternative Federal No-Fault Plan (Title III) becomes effective in a state either by the adoption of a plan declared not to be
in accordance with the national standards by the Review Board or upon
the failure of the state's chief executive officer to certify, pursuant to
section 202(c), that the state has enacted a no-fault plan in accordance
with the national standards. In either instance the Review Board is
directed to meet within 90 days following the second anniversary of the
enactment of the Act and issue a declaration that the state does not
have a no-fault plan for motor-vehicle insurance in accordance with
national standards. If, on the third anniversary of the enactment of the
Act, the state does not have a proper no-fault plan, the Review Board
is directed to meet within 90 days and so declare.3 2 Ninety days after
the issuance of such a declaration, the Title III plan becomes "applicable" to the state. On the 270th day after the Title III plan becomes
applicable to the state, the Title III plan becomes effective in that
33
state.
29. Id. §§ 201(b),(c). The Review Board is directed to treat state certification
of its no-fault plan as prima facie evidence that the plan is in accordance with the
national standards and is to make its determination of whether the plan is so in accordance "only on the basis of substantial evidence." Id. § 202(e).
30. A provision of the 1974 bill, stricken in the 1975 bill, provided that state nofault plans were to go into effect not prior to nine months and not more than twelve
months after enactment by the state. This would allow the Review Board (under the
prior drafting, the Secretary of Transportation) the prescribed 90 days to make a determination as to whether the state plan was in accordance with national standards. The
current bill has no similar provision.
31. S. 354 § 202(d).
32. Id. § 202(e).
33. Id. § 202(f). The fact of a Title III plan's applicability to the state is of
no consequence except as a final warning to the state that a Title III plan will go into,
effect in the state after 90 days.
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B. The Alternative Federal No-FaultPlan
The manner in which the Title III plan is implemented in the
states under the 1974 bill and under the 1975 bill reflects the substantial change in the approach of the bill from the 1974 proposal to the
recent amendments. The Senate Commerce Committee was emphatic
in saying with regard to the 1974 bill that at no point would the federal government be called upon to regulate the business of motor-vehicle insurance in the state:
Title III is a direct Federal government no-fault plan for motor
vehicle accident victim compensation and restoration, but it is not
a plan for Federal government administration or insurance regulation
in that State. The alternative plan operates directly on eligible
claimants and will be enforced on a case-by-case basis in the courts
regardless of the effectiveness or lack thereof of its administration and
regulation by the government of that34State. In no case will there be
Federal Government administration.
In contrast, the 1975 Act provides in part: "Whenever the alternative
Federal no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance in accordance with
Title III is in effect in a State, such plan shall be implemented, operated, and maintained exclusively by the Secretary of Transportation
... ."-5 With respect to the 1975 amendment, provision is made for the
adoption of the operating function by the state Commissioner upon
certification by the state's chief executive officer that the state has enacted legislation empowering the Commissioner to discharge these
functions.36 Nonetheless, it is clear that in responding to the criticism
levelled at the original method of implementing Title III plans, the
bill has been altered radically and, as will be seen below, ill serves the
37
interests of federalism.
Title III embodies the operative provisions of Titles I and II, but
substitutes the judgment of Congress for that of the states that are unwilling to enact a proper Title II plan. Thus, for example, a Title II
34. S. REP. No. 382, at 70-71 (emphasis in original); see S. 354 § 102 (a) (7)
setting out the finding of Congress in this regard. It is interesting to note that the
finding is substantially unchanged from the 1974 bill. Compare S. 354 § 202(g) with

S. REP. No. 382, at 70-72, outlining a Title III state's responsibilities under the 1974
bill.
35. S. 354 § 202(g).
36. The language of section 202(g) was suggested by Attorney General Levi
"to remove the serious constitutional questions raised by the provisions of the bill because
of the imposition of affirmative duties on the States to administer an alternative State

no-fault plan." Letter from Edward H. Levi to Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, June 10,
1975, S. Rvp. No. 283, at 134.
37. See notes 94-99 infra & accompanying text.
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state may establish its own limits for the recovery of work loss and replacement services loss, while the Title III plan fixes these limits without further deference to the states. 8 Although Title II permits suits
in tort for noneconomic detriment (pain and suffering) where certain
threshold conditions have been met, lawsuits are not permitted for
noneconomic detriment under Title III. 39 The Title III plan, with
the noted exceptions, is in other respects the same as Title II.
II. THE

AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS TO ENACr A NO-FAULT LAW

A. The Commerce Power
Most writers who have considered the question have concluded
that the enactment of S. 354 falls within the authority of Congress to
regulate commerce. It has further been suggested that the "Post Roads"
power of article I, section 8 of the Constitution would authorize the enactment.40 Such analysis, while clearly supported by the commerce clause
38. Compare S. 354 §§ 204(b),(c) with id. §§ 302(b),(c).
39. Compare id. § 206(a) (5) with id. § 303(a); see S. REP. No. 382, at 72.
40. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ... ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8. See also Griswold, 1974 House Hearings, pt. 2, at 1059-79; Sands, Constitutionality of Automobile Accident Compensation Reform by Federal Law-A Second
Look, 21 CATHOLIC U. L. Rav. 386, 396 (1972). But see Sands, Constitutionality of
Automobile Accident Reform by Federal Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REFORM (Dep't of Transp. ed. 1972). Dean Griswold relies upon
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. [Second Employers Liability Case], 223 U.S. 1

(1912), upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Employers Liability Act which
imposed liability on employers for injuries to employees caused by the employer's negligence or defective equipment and abrogated the common law fellow servant rule. The
Court held that insofar as employers would tend to prevent the negligent acts by virtue
of the imposition of liability, the commerce in which the employees were engaged would
be advanced. 223 U.S. at 50-51. Certainly, today the Court would not be required to
engage in syllogistic reasoning of this sort to declare the same act constitutional. See also
the analysis of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1943),
on which Dean Griswold relies for the proposition that the Congress may regulate the
business of insurance. Griswold, supra, at 1074-78.
The "post Roads" power vests in Congress the authority "[t]o establish Post Offices
and post Roads." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7. See Dean Griswold's analysis of this
power as contributing to the authority of Congress to enact S. 354, which apparently has
persuaded the S. 354 drafters. See Griswold, supra, at 1060; S. 354 § 102(a) (2). In
another context the "Post Offices" power of article I, section 8, was conjoined with the
commerce power to prevent the use of the mails in connection with the sale of an unregistered security. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970); see United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d
779, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969). The use of the "Post
Offices" power in this context perhaps recognizes that the constitutional grant of authority to the Congress need not be unduly restricted by the requirement of subtle manipulations of fact in order to place an enactment within the scope of the commerce clause. A
more plausible reading of article I, section 8, could suggest that the 17 enumerated
powers should be read as suggestive of the type and breadth of authority which Congress possesses to remove an area of regulation from the purview of the states and oversee nationally.
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cases decided during the earlier part of this century, 41 is less than satisfactory in light of the more recent construction of the commerce
power. Later cases discussing the permissible scope of congressional
regulation under the commerce clause have, while continuing to speak
in the language of the older cases in attempting to locate a tangible
and specific burden on commerce as a source of power for congressional
action, in fact departed significantly from the mechanistic and formal
structuring of the commerce power.4 2 In this way the decision by the
Court in Perez v. United States43 may be understood as a vindication
of Congress' right to proscribe certain criminal activities which it
deemed properly regulated by the national government, although no
constitutional grant of authority directly or inferentially confers upon
Congress the power to regulate loan sharking. 44 Thus, the non-specific
formulation in Perez of a "class of activities" which, as a class, have
an impact upon commerce is an open-ended definition of congressional
power which at the same time reflects the requirement of the older
cases that the evil which the legislation remedies have a measurable
effect on commerce. The unarticulated consequence of Perez is a
41. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-40 (1937); .A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-47 (1935); Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1912).
.
42. Compare, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) with Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Perez was
concerned with the constitutionality of the application of the Consumer Credit Protection Act which provides criminal penalties for persons engaging in extortionate credit
transactions, which are defined as credit transactions in which the failure to repay could
result in violence or other criminal enforcement. Although there was no showing that
the defendant's actions in any way affected commerce, the Court upheld the conviction
based upon findings by the Congress that extensive connections existed between loan
sharks and organized crime; that a substantial portion of the'income of organized crime
was generated by loan sharking; and that organized crime is interstate in character.
402 U.S. at 147 n.l. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
43. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
44. It can readily be seen that the debate here implicated goes back as far as the
dispute over the power of Congress to establish the Bank of the United States. Although
it is unnecessary to descend into that imbroglio here, it may fairly be said that the Jeffersonian position receives little support today. Even if his fear ("To take a single step
beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take
possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." 3
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 146 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903)) seems to have materialized in the current construction of article I, section 8, and the commerce clause especially, the resurrection of such arguments would constitute a political, but not a legal
objection to the enactment of S. 354. But see Note, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 750, 761-64
(1968), wherein it is argued that the power to regulate commerce, which has been called
"plenary" (see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)), may be exercised fully with regard to activities which "affect" commerce, but should be employed
sparingly in the case of "social legislation," such as that involved in Katzenbach v.
Mc~lung, where the activity in question is only tenuously related to commerce.
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latitude of congressional enactment limited only by the Congress' perception of the problem as suitably remedied by legislation at the na45
tional level.
If one understands that the commerce clause represents a grant of
authority to the national government and at the same time a surrender
of power by the states, the allocation of power between the state and
national governments under the interpretation of the commerce clause
just suggested is marked only by shifting and indefinite criteria. This
uncertainty, however, is not due to a failure of the Court to enunciate
in terms the standard by which it evaluates the propriety of a congressional enactment under the commerce power. The problem exists as
much in Perez as it did for Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden
where he was called upon to quantify the power accorded the national
government under the commerce clause. 46 Clearly in Gibbons he was
casting about for more substantial criteria when he landed upon tradition and common expectations as the means by which the congressional power to regulate navigation as an incident of commerce was
justified. This is not, however, to suggest that the eclectic manner in
which he outlined the scope of the commerce power less accurately
reflected the bounds of that power than the most recent class-of-activities formulation-indeed by its uncertainty of measurement the device suggests the expansive scope of the constitutional mandate. It
acknowledges that the commerce clause assists in the division of power
between the state and national government.
45. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), upheld the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to employees of an "enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce.
As originally enacted the Act applied only to employees who themselves produced goods
for commerce or engaged in commerce. The amendments were upheld on the theory that
Congress could reasonably conclude that the imposition of substandard wages and hours
on employees by an employer had the effect of giving employers who required low wages
and long hours a competitive advantage over employers who provided better wages
and hours and that interstate commerce fostered the arbitrage function by which wages
could be depressed and hours kept long. The Court indicated that it was following
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and was "of course concerned only with
the finding of a substantial effect on interstate competition, and not with the consequent
policy decisions." 392 U.S. at 189-90.
46. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
[The power to regulate navigation] has been exercised from the commencement
of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been
understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and
has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation.
It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of
the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government,
and must have been contemplated in forming it.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190.
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Since the "class of activities" analysis undertaken in Perez fails to
articulate the extent of congressional authority under the commerce
clause, it remains to be seen whether a test or formula by which the
constitutionality of a congressional enactment may be determined can
be distilled from the decided cases. It will be maintained that the functional allocation of power between Congress and the Court renders
Congress the appropriate body to determine the operational scope of
the commerce power; determinations regarding the permissibility of
Congress' enacting a given piece of legislation will be seen as essentially
47
legislative decisions.
In the present Act the Congress found that "[m]otor vehicles are
the primary instrumentality for the transportation of individuals
within the United States," that "[t]he transportation of individuals by
motor vehicle over Federal-aid highways occurs in, or affects, interstate commerce," that an adequate system of automobile accident reparations is "necessary and proper for the protection and advancement
of commerce and a suitable and desirable concomitant to the establishment of post roads and the expenditure of moneys therefor," and that
various aspects of the present reparations system constitute an "undue
burden on commerce." 4 Although these findings elide the reasoning
by which a connection between an humane and efficient system of automobile accident reparations and the regulation of commerce is established, the answer to the question posed concerning criteria for testing
the propriety of a congressional enactment is suggested both by the
conclusory manner in which these findings are cast, which is typical of
congressional findings generally, and the following language of Mr.
49
Justice Clark in Katzenbach v. McClung:
47. Professor Cox has noted the difficulty with which the Court engaged in fact
finding in order to determine whether certain activities have a close and substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. GIN. L. Rav. 199, 225 (1971). He goes on to say that:
It soon became apparent, however, that no court was capable of drawing such
a line in terms appropriate for continuing judicial administration. Whether and
when to maintain a degree of balance between State and federal regulation
became essentially a congressional decision without meaningful judicial scrutiny
even though the determinations went to the heart of our federal system.
Id. at 225-26 (footnote omitted). The remoteness of the activity in question from commerce, rather than the existence vel non of a connective, is the issue which must be
considered. However, whether the activity is appropriately linked to interstate commerce
is often a question of policy or a matter of inferences which might be drawn only after
close study of the problem. United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1 (1971);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964).
48. S. 354 §§ 102(a) (1)-(a) (3).
49. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when a particular
activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further
examination by this Court. But where we find that the legislators...
had a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary
to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.50
Thus, the search for the test by which an enactment of Congress is determined to be within the commerce power is more fruitfully pursued
by answering the more fundamental question: who properly determines whether an act of Congress is within the power to regulate commerce? The opinion of Justice Clark in Katzenbach v. McClung as well
as the result in Perez suggest that the bounds of congressional authority
under the commerce clause are operationally determined by the Congress. In other words, the allocation of power between the state and
national governments is at bottom a political determination, made
by representatives from the individual states. Determining the proper
reach of the commerce clause is not an improper role for the Congress.
Whether in fact loan sharking is a problem properly remedied at the
national level is a typical legislative decision. The courts are not well
equipped to conduct lengthy hearings, find voluminous facts and, in
the end, engage in speculation as to the manner in which loan sharking
may be curbed. It is just such a decision, however, which must be
made prior to a determination whether the national government
should involve itself in the regulation of such matters. This is not to
suggest that the power of Congress is boundless or that its determination is made without reference to constitutional standards. While the
Court may always exercise its authority to nullify an enactment which
is outside the commerce power, recent cases underscore the proposition
that within the gross (albeit unclear) limits established by the Court,
the determination whether a given matter is properly regulated by
50. Id. at 303-04. It should be clear from the foregoing that exclusive reliance
upon the commerce clause for the authority of Congress to enact S. 354 and legislate
generally probably distorts and perhaps in some cases unduly limits the scope of permissible enactments by the Congress. Justice Goldberg appeared to recognize this in
his concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291
(1964), wherein he argued that the underlying congressional authority for the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a et. seq. (1970)) was properly based on section
5 of the fourteenth amendment. Although he expressed no doubt that the necessary
authority was also located in the commerce clause, Justice Goldberg explained that
"[t]he primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, as the Court recognizes and I would underscore, is the vindication of human dignity and not mere
economics." 379 U.S. at 291. Consistent with this reasoning, one could perhaps locate
the authority to enact S. 354 in the power of Congress to provide for the "general
Welfare." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
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the national government is for Congress to make. 51
It should be clear under the analysis of the commerce clause just
made that after Perez and Katzenbach v. McClung, S. 354 falls well
within the enumerated powers in providing for a national system of
automobile accident reparations based upon the no-fault principle.
One would interpret the powers of Congress too narrowly to justify
the legislation solely on the notion of a "national transportation system," or the power of Congress to regulate the business of insurance,
although these elements contribute to the amalgamation of a problem
nationwide in scope of which the Congress may properly take cognizance.
B. Tenth Amendment Considerations
Having concluded that the enactment of S. 354 would be a proper
exercise of the congressional power to regulate commerce, we next
consider the objection that the bill, in imposing affirmative duties on
the states, would be barred by the tenth amendment. 52 The criticism
is directed at the Title III Alternative Federal No-Fault Plan, which
would be implemented without the voluntary action of the states, requiring the state Commissioner of Insurance to discharge various
duties as part of the statutory scheme of enforcement at the state
level.5 The reasoning of the tenth amendment objection is that the
51. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
52. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Professor Dorsen explains his
tenth amendment objections as follows:
[F]ederaism values are . . . constitutionally grounded. Unless they are to be
reduced to banalities, they are capable of confining national legislative authority.
Dorsen, supra note 6, at 61 (citation omitted). At another point he posits: "The tenth
amendment issue is the reason why the supremacy clause of article VI, taken in conjunction with the commerce clause, cannot suffice to validate the proposed legislation."
Id. at 48 n.18. Although the supremacy clause is discussed below (see note 79 infra),
it is sufficient to say at this point that the supremacy clause validates no act of Congress.
An act may be, for example, a permissible exercise of the commerce power. The issue
whether the act is the supreme law of the land is, however, separate and distinct. Professor Dorsen must be taken as saying that S. 354 would be an improper exercise of
the commerce power because of a bar erected by the tenth amendment.
53. The reference here is to the 1974 bill. The questions raised with regard to
S. 354 concerning the interests of federalism and other constitutional questions prompted
an amendment to the bill on July 15, 1975, which attempted to satisfy the objections.
See note 5 supra. However, the questions raised herein with regard to the 1974 bill
are of continuing vitality in that at least three bills similar in material respects to the
1974 bill are pending before the House of Representatives. It is noteworthy that two of
these bills were only recently introduced. See H.R. 1900, H.R. 7985 and H.R. 8441,
all 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The state Commissioner of Insurance is required by operation of the Title III
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imposition of duties upon officers of the states violates principles of
state sovereignty in that state officers are made the agents of the federal
government and the soverign function of empowering state officers is
thereby usurped.54 While the argument possesses substance at the level
of policy, it cannot rise to the status of a legal objection because of the
current construction of the tenth amendment and the broad latitude
accorded Congress in effectuating its purposes under the necessary and
proper clause, discussed below.55 Chief Justice Stone writing in United
States v. Darby5 with regard to the function of the tenth amendment
and the power of Congress to regulate the wages and hours of employees engaged in the production of lumber for interstate commerce,
responded to the contention that the regulation of wages and hours of
persons engaged in manufacturing had been reserved to the states, thus
barring regulation by the federal government:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to
the states might not be able to
exercise powers not granted, and that
57
exercise fully their reserved powers.
Under this reading of the tenth amendment, proper exercises of a
constitutional grant of power may not be limited merely because
the entity upon which the burden is imposed is a state and not an individual.5 s The facts of Maryland v. Wirtz5 9 provide a useful illustraplan to either adopt or supervise a plan to insure the availability of security to all
persons who own motor vehicles; that an assigned risk or other joint insurance arrangement mahes security available to those not able to purchase security in the market;
that certain optional coverage and provision for the financing of premiums are available.
S. 354 § 105(a). He is required to approve the rates and terms of insurance provided
within the state and disseminate information regarding the rates and coverage of
available insurance. Id. § 109(a)(b). An assigned claims plan must be established or
supervised for the payment of claims by persons whose coverage is inapplicable or inadequate. Id. § 108(b). A program must be established for the purpose of evaluating
and supervising emergency medical services and medical and vocational rehabilitation
services. Id. § 109(c).
54. Dorsen, supra note 6, at 47.
55. See notes 65-78 infra & accompanying text.
56. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. Id. at 124.
58. Fry v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 1792 (1975) (upholding the application of
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (see note following 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. I,
1970)) to limit salary increases for employees of the State of Ohio); Maryland v.
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don. In that case, the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act extended the coverage of the Act to persons employed by schools
and hospitals, whether public or private, and employees of states and
their political subdivisions. Although it was argued that the amendments could have the effect of requiring states to increase taxes in
order to pay the required higher salaries, an action that in some states
could require a constitutional amendment, the Court held: "If a state
is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the
Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State
too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation." °
Although cases have generally considered the extent to which the Congress may regulate activities engaged in by the states in the context of
governing an activity carried on by both states and individuals, 61 there
appears to be no reason to limit the permissive scope of congressional
regulation to activities which are also carried on by individuals, or by
the state in a proprietary as opposed to a governmental capacity, a
62
distinction which the Court has rejected.
No doubt there exists a core of sovereign state activities which may
not be interfered with by the federal government. If it is assumed, as
seems necessary, that the tenth amendment should be construed in
pari materia with the enumerated powers, the result of protecting certain sovereign interests of the states may be achieved by saying that
an act of Congress that encroaches upon state sovereignty is not within
the power of Congress because it is not one of the powers granted to
the federal government. Recalling for the moment the construction
made of the enumerated powers, in which the allocation of power beWirt;, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (discussed at note 45 supra); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of
the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (action based on Federal Employers
Liability Act held to prevail over the defense of sovereign immunity pleaded by the
State of Alabama, which owned the railroad, on the ground that "[b]y empowering
Congress to regulate commerce .. . the States necessarily surrendered any portion of
their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." 377 U.S. at 192).
Cases involving the taxation of the enterprises of states and their political subdivisions
have held the power of Congress to tax coterminus with the power to regulate state
activities. (Such a result follows logically from the principle that taxation is closely
akin to more naked exercises of regulatory authority. See Solzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937)). See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)
(tax imposed on mineral waters sold by the State of New York upheld); Board -f
Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (import duty imposed on purchase by state instrumentality upheld); Collector v. Day (Buffington v.
Day), 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 129 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (strong dissent
to opinion holding the income of state court judges immune from federal taxation).
59. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
60. Id. at 197.
61. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 95 S.Ct. 1792 (1975).
62. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580-81 (1946).
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tween the state and national governments was seen to be a congressi6nal function, it becomes apparent that the delimitation of the scope
of congressional enactments which have the effect"of encroaching upon
sovereign state interests is, again, subject to gross limits, a matter for
the determination of Congress.'
Is then the present Act so destructive of sovereign state interests that
it falls outside the bounds within which Congress is entitled to determine the scope of its regulation? It has been pointed out that the
duties imposed upon state officers by Title III of the present Act differ
materially from the levies of taxes on state enterprises or the imposition of minimum wage and hour standards on states which have been
upheld, in that the requirement of action on the part of state officers
is a uniquely sovereign attribute.64 However, the limit beyond which

Congress may not go in infringing state sovereignty does not exist in
63. Although no discovered case has invalidated an act of Congress as violative
of sovereign state interests, recent cases uniformly indicate that some bounds exist upon
congressional action in the area. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the plurality in New
York o. United States, announced that a tax upon a state enterprise would be upheld
"so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not
uniquely capable of being earned only by a state. . . ." 326 U.S. at 582. But see United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (suit brought to recover statutory penalty
for violation of Federal Safety Appliances Act by State-owned railroad: "The state
can no more deny [the plenary power to regulate commerce] than can an individual."
297 U.S. at 185). The most recent expression of the Supreme Court seems to indicate
that bounds are placed on the commerce power by the tenth amendment:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism" ...
it is
not without significance .... Congress may not exercise [the commerce] power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
Fry v. United States, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 1795 n.7 (1975). However, the opinion of eight
members went on to hold the application of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 to
state employees to constitute "no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty." Id. The
suggestion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist that Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) be
reconsidered was not alluded to by the majority. 95 S.Ct. at 1801 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27, wherein the groundwork
for the opinion in Fry is laid; United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
These opinions are not inconsistent with the approach taken that the determination of
the limits on the commerce power insofar as an enactment transgresses sovereign state
interests is properly made by the Congress. It should be noted that the expressions of
the Court in the opinions just cited suggesting that limits on the commerce power do
exist by virtue of the tenth amendment are in the context of upholding the various
enactments. The language of the Court may then be read as an advisory expression
of a cautionary nature to the Congress. The extent to which the counsel is heeded, however, within gross limits which the Court retains power to police, is a matter for the
Congress. A similar approach has been observed by Professor Cox: "The current habit
is to acknowledge only constitutional limitations the court will enforce, but this was
never so in the British practice, and our earlier history is filled with occasions on which
institutions of government have yielded voluntarily or have been made to yield by political
forces to limitations framed in constitutional terms even though no judicial process was
.available." Cox, supra note 47, at 206.
64. Dorsen, supra note 6, at 55-58.
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the abstract. It is established by the latitude granted to Congress in
implementing its purposes and also by reference to the history of legislation which has deputized state officers. These considerations will be
discussed in the next section.
C. The Breadth of Authority Under the Necessary and Proper Clause
In the analysis of the tenth amendment objections it was found that
'the extent to which Congress may act in a fashion that impairs sovereign state interests is defined in large part by the Congress itself,
subject to gross limitations imposed by the Court. Since, however, it
is the means selected by the Congress to implement no-fault nationally
which have raised tenth amendment objections, we have deferred until
now an independent examination of those means under the necessary
and proper clause. 5 It should be clear that the Congress cannot be
limited to a single mechanism, or even the most direct mechanism,
for implementing no-fault legislation. The classic exposition of the
broad latitude thus available to the Congress is contained in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland:66 "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
67
constitution, are constitutional.1
In the present Act, the Congress expressly found that "[d]irect
Federal Government action is neither necessary nor desirable" for the
establishment of no-fault nationally. 68 In order to assess the constitutionality of the method of implementation selected by the Congress it
must first be determined whether the means selected are reasonably
65. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 18, provides: "The Congress shall have Power.
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 310 (1819).
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). A stronger formulation of the same
principal is furnished by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries:
If the legislature possesses a right of choice to the means, who can limit that
choice? Who is appointed an umpire, or arbiter in cases, where a discretion is
confided to a government? The very idea of such a controlling authority in the
exercise of its powers is a virtual denial of the supremacy of the government
in regard to its powers. It repeals the supremacy of the national government,
proclaimed by the constitution.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 118 (re-

print of the 1833 ed. 1970).
68. S. 354 § 102(a) (7).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

related to the purpose of the enactment. 69 Although it is probably clear
that the device of deputizing the states is, as a general matter, sufficiently related to the purposes of the Act, the tenth amendment considerations are applicable here as well and it is in the context of the
scrutiny of the means chosen by Congress to implement the Title III
plan that the tenth amendment objections will be put to rest.
That it is within the permissible scope of congressional enactment
to effectuate legislative purposes by employing the states as agents of
the national government is demonstrated by reference to the long history of such legislation,7" and newer statutory vehicles, such as condi69. This is by now the accepted standard of review. See Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (implementation of voting rights held to permit displacement of state-required literacy tests); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 321
(1966) (implementation of voting rights under the fifteenth amendment); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (regulation of hours, wages and other conditions of employment); James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59
(1924) (prohibition of the prescription of liquor for medicinal purposes under the eighteenth amendment).
70. This concept of state-federal relations was early illustrated by James Madison
in the Federalist:
If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also . . . . Those of the former will be principally on
the sea-coast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread
over the face of the country, and will be very numerous . . . . It is true that
the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal
as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this
power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue;
and that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by
previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection under immediate authority of the Union will generally be made by the officers, and
according to the rules, appointed by the several Staten ....
Quoted in Holcombe, The States as Agents of the Nation, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CoNsTrr=rroNAL LAw 1189 (A.A.L.S. ed. 1938). Professor Holcombe's entire article
merits examination. See also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), where the
Court stated:
We think the power of justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and
deliver them on board their vessels . . . may be lawfully conferred upon state
officers. That the authority is a most convenient one to entrust to such officers
cannot be denied, as seamen frequently leave their vessels in small places, where
there are no Federal judicial officers, and where a justice of the peace may
usually be found, with authority to issue warrants under the state laws.
165 U.S. at 280. See also United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883) (upheld federal
legislation allowing compensation for lands taken by the federal government to be determined in state proceedings according to state laws); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 66 (1860) (discussed at note 83 infra). The following statutes authorize
state officers to enforce various provisions of federal law: Plant Quarantine Act, 7
U.S.C. § 156 (1970); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715 et. seq.
(1970); The National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); Food and Drugs
Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 7, 9 Stat. 462;
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a). See also Hart, Some Legal Questions Growing Out of the
President's Executive Order for ProhibitionEnforcement, 13 VA, L. REv. 86 (1926)
(discussing Executive Order of May 8, 1926, authorizing state officers to enforce the
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tional spending legislation, 71 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970.72 The Clean Air Act Amendments furnish an especially useful
example in that they provide for extensive interaction between the
state and national governments: enforcement and monitoring at the
state level and the establishment of ambient air quality standards at
the national level. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 73 which arose under the Clean Air Act

Amendments, the state contended that EPA regulations requiring
Pennsylvania to ensure the installation of certain antipollution equipment on particular cars within the state unconstitutionally infringed
the state's sovereignty. Indicating that its decision was "guided by practical considerations," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the
interests of federalism and rejected the state's contention as it related
to state-federal interaction under the Clean Air Act Amendments. Because the underlying problem and the congressional resolution in the
Clean Air Act Amendments are very much similar to the no-fault insurance needs and the mechanics of S. 354, the following excerpt from
the opinion of Judge VanDusen is instructive:
In enacting the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Congress created
an interlocking governmental structure in which the Federal Government and the states would cooperate to reach the primary goal of
the Act-the attainment of national ambient air quality standards.
Under its provisions, state and local governments retain responsibility
for the basic design and implementation of air pollution strategies,
subject to approval and, if necessary, enforcement by the Administrator. We believe that this approach represents a valid adaption [sic] of
federalist principles to the need for increased federal involvement.
The only alternative implementation would be for the Federal Government to assume some of the functions of traffic control and vehicle
registration and directly enforce the programs contained in thd various transportation control plans. The Administrator has determined
that this would not be a practicable way of attaining national air
National Prohibition Act); Luneberg, Federal-State Interaction Under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 637, 664 n.114 (1973) (acts
and cases assembled); Mermin, "Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal
Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57
YALE LJ. 1, 13 n.42 (1947) (comprehensive collection of statutes, cases and articles
relating to delegation of authority to states and state officials by the federal govern-

ment).
71. See note 76 infra.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. II, 1972).
73. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
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quality standards... and we fail to see how this would represent an
intrusion upon state sovereignty. 74

An earlier statutory vehicle, conditional spending legislation, was designed to serve similar ends by means of conditioning federal grants in
aid upon the adoption of a prescribed course of action by the state.
The Court in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis75 upheld the constitutionality of such legislation over the claim of Alabama that the state
had been "coerced" into enacting unemployment compensation laws.
The Court minimized the coercive aspect of the legislation in holding
that Alabama had freely made her choice and noted that the choice
made had the desired effect of displacing the federal regulation that
would otherwise result with state administration." Although the opinion in Commonwealth of Pennsylvaniaperhaps addresses the reality of
state, deputization more directly, it would seem fair to characterize
both opinions as analyzing the means which are said to infringe state
sovereignty in the context of the net result achieved by the statutory
mechanism. Put in other words, the legality of deputizing state officers
under the S. 354 Title III plan may not be determined by focusing on
the propriety of using state officers to carry out a federal mandate as a
question sui generis. Rather, the mechanism chosen must be evaluated
in light of other means that the Congress might have selected, such
74. 500 F.2d 246, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1974). The scope and characteristics of the
problems which gave rise to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (42 U.S.C. §§
1857-18571 (Supp. II, 1972)) are strikingly similar to those which prompted consideration of S. 354: (1) The states had made little progress in combatting air pollution.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist characterized the amendments as the Congress' "taking a stick

to the States." Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 95 S. Ct. 1470, 1474
(1975). (2) It was found that national ambient-air-quality standards would have to
be established because the states were politically unable to set such standards themselves, albeit for reasons not common to those underlying S. 354. Note, Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J. 153, 157 (1972). (3)
It was clear that without assistance from state and local officials, the gathering of information and formulation of air quality standards for areas with peculiar and idiosyn-

cratic needs would be an impossible task. Id. at 164-70; Luneberg, supra note 70, at
664-65.
75. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
76. 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937). The Court expressly left open the question,
however, whether federal performance conditioned upon the adoption of a statute un-

related to activities within the scope of proper federal regulation would be permitted

(301 U.S. at 90), perhaps confirming Mr. Justice Butler's suspicion that the "consent"
of the state existed more in name than in fact. 301 U.S. at 618. See also Emergency
Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046, which imple-

mented a maximum speed limit of 55 m.p.h. throughout the country by providing for
the withholding of funds available for the construction of highways (under 23 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1970)) to states that did not within 60 days establish the required minimum
speed limits.
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as establishing bureaus in every state to carry out the duties imposed
on the state Commissioner under the Title III plan. As between the
two, the court would then be required to decide whether the scheme
chosen unduly interferes with sovereign state interests.7 7 The execution of no-fault nationally would require an administrative bureaucracy capable of communicating readily with every automobile owner
in each Title III state, in much the same way that the Glean Air Act
Amendments require extensive localized activity. The Congress could
reasonably have concluded that such administrative needs were appro78
priately remedied by the employment of state officials.
III.

STATE

&

FEDERAL RELATIONS

A. The Availability of ExtraordinaryRemedies
The question remains for consideration whether a remedy would
be available to compel a recalcitrant state to enforce those duties imposed on states by a Title III plan which in practice would not be
self-executory.7 9 Although the Senate Commerce Committee heard
77. Professor Dorsen's notion of an "independent scrutiny of means" (Dorsen,
supra note 6, at 48) may thus be seen to erode the base of the necessary and proper
clause in withdrawing from the purview of Congress legislative means which allow
deputization of the states. Insofar as such an approach would necessitate the reconsideration of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and conditional
spending legislation generally, it may be seen as both unrealistic and inconsistent with
present notions of federalism. It is difficult to see how legislation which would require
the federal government to enforce 55 m.p.h. maximum speed limits (see note 76 supra)
produces better state-federal relations, although' such a proposal may have a superficially theoretical appeal.
78. It is the unstated premise of those who have argued that the pressing of state
officials into service violates two principles of federalism: (1) that federalism requires
states to have the authority to enforce laws concerned with localized activities, and (2)
that states have the authority to write the laws by which their officers may act. While
it is clear that the latter proposition is a desirable one in many instances, it is not so
clear that both principles are inseparable or essential in all cases. In this light, it is
rather a mystery how S. 354, section 202(g), in displacing state regulation with federal
regulation, could be thought to better respect the interests of state sovereignty than the
1974 bill. Instead the 1975 bill compounds the so-called evils of the 1974 bill in legislating in a manner that transgresses both principles in withdrawing ffom the states the
function of regulating the business of insurance.
79. It should be clear that the availability of such a remedy does not speak to the
legitimacy of the congressional enactment of S. 354. It has been concluded that such an
enactment is within the power of Congress. The availability of the remedy goes to the
effectiveness of the legislation, which, is ultimately a political and not a legal question.
The supremacy clause of article VI and the pre-emption provision of the bill
(S. 354 § 202(a)) firmly establish the power of the federal government to nullify
provisions of state law which would prevent the adoption or implementation of S. 354
in all of its particulars. Florida Lime,& Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963);
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testimony to the contrary, it is within the authority of the federal
government to delegate responsibilities to officers of the states.80 State
officers' regularly enforce federal law as judges in the state courts.
Professor Hart has noted the great practical difficulties which would
arise if federal courts alone enforced federal law-the necessity of establishing many more federal tribunals, the possibility that cases
would have to be removed to the federal courts in order to resolve
federal question components of a lawsuit. He goes on to speculate
whether states could be required to furnish courts of competent jurisdiction to entertain federal rights of actions, and concludes, in language
appropriate also to the questions raised by certain critics of S. 354, by referring to "the great fact of political science that ultimate questions
often do not have to be faced in successful collaborative living." 8'
Few cases have directly addressed the question whether the federal government may maintain enforcement proceedings against the
states. Supposing that a state would refuse to enforce a Title III
plan, the United States Attorney General could properly commence
an action against either the recalcitrant state or appropriate state
officers. It has been suggested that mandamus or mandatory injunction would be the appropriate remedies. 82 Although two cases8 3
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824). Judges in state
courts would be required to enforce provisions of the act inconsistent with state law.
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
80. Statement of Andre Maisonpierre, vice president of the American Mutual
Insurance Alliance, 1973 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 772. Although the Supreme Court
has never addressed this argument directly, it impliedly acquiesced to a contrary position in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958). The decision
was technically based on res judicata in that the city had had an opportunity to argue
the question before the court of appeals in an earlier case (State of Washington Dep't
of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953)), but it should be noted that
the decision permitted the municipality, a licensee of the Federal Power Commission,
to condemn a state-owned fish hatchery, an act which would have been ultra vires
without a grant of authority from the FPC. A later decision quoted the following
language from the decision in State of Washington in reaching a similar result: "[ihe
state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the
licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the
stream is under the dominion of the United States." Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FPC,
308 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963). See also notes
83, 84 infra.
81. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv.
489, 507-08 (1954).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1970). "[IThe Attorney General [has] broad powers to
institute and maintain court proceedings in order to safeguard national interests."
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947). Mandamus is usually thought
to be available for the purpose of compelling a body or officer to perform a ministerial
task (e.g., the issuance of a motor vehicle registration) but not a task which involves
the discretion of an official. However, when a public official or body is required 'by
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8
which arose in the last century under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 4
went so far as to hold that the federal government could not compel
a state officer to perform a particular duty, one critic has opined that
it is "a fair question" whether the Court would reach the same resuit today.8 5
Recent cases, however, have shown the Court willing to approve
remedies against state officers. Understandably, the Court is reluctant to impose such remedies and has given the states the widest possible berth before resorting to enforcement.8 6 An example is furnished by the controversy between Virginia and West Virginia over
the payment of a portion of the public debt of the original State of
Virginia assumed by the State of West Virginia at the time of its
creation as a state. After eight trips to the Supreme Court, Virginia
sought a writ of mandamus to force the legislature of West Virginia
to levy taxes for the payment of the amount owing. The opinion of
Chief Justice White has been characterized as "saying definitely and
in strong language that the judgment was enforceable but not saying
law to perform an act, even though the action is discretionary, the steadfast refusal
to exercise discretion, or to act at all, is properly remedied by a writ of mandamus.
United States ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. v. ICC, 252 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1920). In
addition, when the public interest is involvedj equitable powers "assume an even
broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake."
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
83. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860) where the Court
stated:
It is true that Congress may authorize a particular State officer to perform
a particular duty; but if he declines to do so, it does not follow that he may
be coerced, or punished for his refusal. And we are very far from supposing,
that in using this word "duty," the statesmen who framed and passed the
law, or the President who approved and signed it, intended to exercise a
coerceive power over State officers not warranted by the Constitution.
65 U.S. (24 How.) at 108. See also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
615-16 (1842).
84. Ch. XLV, 1 Stat. 302, enacted pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.2
which provides: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed
to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
85. See Holcombe, supra note 70, at 1193. Both Prigg and Kentucky v. Dennison
may be understood if one realizes that a contrary determination would have been
exceedingly difficult to enforce.
86. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of
Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). In Wyoming
v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940), Wyoming sought to have Colorado held in contempt of court for the violation of a decree previously handed down. The Court found
"room for misunderstanding" and entered a new decree with which Colorado complied.
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exactly how."87 During its next term the West Virginia Legislature
passed an act approving payment.
Although the Court more often alluded to the availability of a
remedy against a state rather than directly formulating the terms,
this does not suggest that the Court is unwilling to vindicate the
underlying right. The Court has recognized that the iteration of the
availability of remedies is often sufficient. This was the position of
Chief Justice Warren in an early reapportionment case:
We do not consider here the difficult question of the proper remedial devices which federal courts should utilize in state legislative
apportionment cases ....
[The District Court] correctly recognized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when
a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional
requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so. 8 8

In Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County,9 handed down
one month before the Sims opinion just quoted, the Court was faced
with the task of formulating the proper remedies to be employed
against county officials who had closed public schools and refused to
levy school taxes rather than conform to the decree of the Supreme
Court requiring desegregation of the schools in Davis v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County 0o a companion case to Brown
v. Board of Education. The Court indicated that, on remand, "the
District Court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to
levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain
without racial discrimination a public school system . . ...
" The
Supreme Court in a 1966 decision involving the reapportionment of
the Hawaii legislature gave its approval to the district court's retention of jurisdiction pending the electorate's determination whether
87. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S.

565 (1918); HART AND

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 269 (2d ed.

WECHSLER'S

P. Bator, P. Mishkin,

D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler 1973); see in this context Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,

585-86 (1964).
88. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585-86 (1964).
89. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
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a constitutional convention should be convened and thereafter to
2
insure that the permanent reapportionment be made effective .
While one writer has noted that cases holding the federal judiciary within its rights in compelling state officers to engage in
affirmative courses of action have arisen largely in the area of personal
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (as well-as the Civil Rights
Amendments, one assumes), the Court has not indicated that such
relief would be unavailable in other contexts. 93
It is submitted that the Court's willingness to permit the district
court to retain jurisdiction during the time that the legislature
re-examines the problem in light of the court's resolution of the legal
issues is a method well suited to secure compliance from recalcitrant
Title III states.
B. The Interests of Federalism
Perhaps the most vociferous attack on S. 354 has been directed
at a seeming gap in the legislation, since remedied by the amendments
of July 15, 1975, whereby states might refuse to enact a Tite II plan
and subsequently refuse to enforce the Title III plan which would go
into effect by operation of law.94 At least two competent critics have
concluded that, because the federal government may be unable successfully to apply coercive force against a recalcitrant state, the Act
as proposed would be either injurious to the interests of federalism or
unconstitutional.95 Several responses to this criticism are available.
First, it is probable that the "horribles" conjured by these critics
will not come to pass; it was envisioned by the Senate Commerce
Committee in its Report that "[no] State will fail to meet its responsibility under this bill . . . ."6 Second, if a state failed to implement
a Title III plan, injured persons could file claims against their insurers
for no-fault benefits under section 111(b), in which they could recover no-fault benefits, the attorney's fees involved in prosecuting the
claim and interest at the rate of 18% per annum on overdue benefits.
92. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 97 (1966).
93. Compare letter from Thomas C. Matthews, Jr., to Senator James 0. Eastland,
Feb. 7, 1974, 1974 Senate Hearings 711 and Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) with Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S.
565 (1918) and Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940).
94. See note 53 supra.
95. Dorsen, supra note 6 passim; Statement of Thomas C. Matthews, Jr., 1974
Senate Hearings 659-63. See also Statement of Mitchell Wendell, 1974 Senate Hearings
219.
96. S.REP. No. 382, at 72.
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State courts would be required to enforce the Title III plan in actions between litigants under Testa v. Katt, and defendants in tort
actions arising out of automobile accidents would have a full defense
to tort liability by virtue of section 303 (a) .97 Other portions of the.
Act which in practice would not be self-executory (a plan for the,
availability of insurance to all owners of motor vehicles, an assigned
claims bureau), the Committee on Commerce concluded, "may in
practice lead to extra burdens being placed on motorists who voluntarily buy the required coverage and on insurers who may have to
form voluntary pools to make the system work, but these problems do
not appear so insuperable as to justify granting to the Secretary any
authority to take over State administration of motor vehicle insurance . ...
-98 Certainly if the aggravated state of affairs posited by
Professor Dorsen were to present itself in a state unwilling to enforce
a Title III plan over a long period of time, Congress could at that
time legislate anew, perhaps enacting a conditional spending law
making federal highway funds available only to those states which
either have in effect a Title II plan or enforce a Title III plan.
Third, it is not clear that extraordinary remedies would be unlavailable to compel an unwilling state to enforce a Title III plan.
The availability of such remedies, however, is not responsive to the
concern that the Act would strain federal-state relations. If, as has
been suggested, the federalist model envisions a national government
possessing sufficient power to deal with matters of national scope
while states retain autonomy over local affairs, a determination of the
extent to which a piece of legislation respects the interests of federalism can be made only after a detailed analysis of the workings of the
legislation within the federal system. To analyze the interests of federalism by reasoning from the abstract principle that the federal
government may not prescribe duties for state officers presupposes a
legislative paradigm in which a statutory mechanism such as deputization of state officers is inappropriate and destructive of federalism.
While the mechanism of deputizing states might not be an acceptable
means of legislating in many instances, it should be clear that in some
'cases deputization of states represents a lesser intrusion upon state
sovereignty than the available alternatives.
It is not difficult to see where the reasoning of the S. 354 critics
would lead. For it was just such thinking to which the Congress re97. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see the discussion at note 79 supra.
98. S. R P. No. 382, at 71-72.
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sponded in drafting the 1975 bill, with the result that a fundamental
objective of the bill, that of maintaining the regulation of insurance
at the state level, has become so much palaver. The product of the
1975 amendments is the total displacement of state regulation of insurance-a function which no one has suggested that the states performed badly-by a duplicative federal bureaucracy unfamiliar with
the task and at least potentially insensitive to the needs of the states.
Finally, it should be clear that the decentralized decision-making
under the 1974 bill which allows each state to draft a no-fault law in
keeping with its individual needs permits the states to function as
"experimental laboratories." As Professor Freund has noted, "[i]n a
realistic sense the ability of the states to experiment depends on the
setting by Congress of certain uniform minimum standards."99 It
appears that the fault system is not responsive to any state's automobile accident insurance needs and that different sorts of no-fault
plans are required by individual states. Given these parameters, the
legislative vehicle of S. 354 establishes no-fault in every state while
maintaining at the state level so much autonomy in fleshing out a
no-fault plan as is consonant with the needs of individual states. This
enactment reflects a fairer appreciation of the interests of federalism,
insofar as decision-making is reserved to the smallest or most localized
.unit of government capable of weighing the factors necessary to the
decision.
CONCLUSION

Under this analysis, then, both the 1974 and 1975 S. 354 are
within the power of Congress, either under the commerce clause or
'other enumerated powers of article I, section 8, to enact. The tenth
amendment objections that have been made are considered to be
without merit given the broad congressional latitude to implement
its purposes under the necessary and proper clause. Although the
Court has indicated that it would not uphold legislation which
99. Freund, The Supreme Court and the Future of Federalism, in THE FUTURE
OF FEDERALiSm 47 (S. Shuman ed. 1968); see in this context Steward Machine Co.

v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-89 (1937), wherein the Court discusses the forces that
prevented the enactment of unemployment compensation laws at the state level. "Many
[states] held back through alarm lest in laying such a toll upon their industries, they
would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with their
neighbors or competitors." 301 U.S. -at 588. It should be clear that analagous forces
have prevented the adoption of no-fault insurance plans in many states. One assumes
that the Congress could take a longer view and reject the arguments that appear to
have prevailed against no-fault at the state level. See Statement of Hon. Frank E. Moss,
United States Senator from Utah, 1974 House Hearings, pt. 1, at 354-55.
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would devour the essentials of state sovereignty, it has correctly
tested legislation for such effects in the context of the operational
characteristics of the statute rather than by analyzing the means selected to implement the statute independently of the statutory purposes.
The interests of federalism are dearly better served by the
1974 bill in that regulation of the business of insurance, a function
performed by the states historically, is continued at the state level.
While the deputization of state officials is not an ideal means of
legislating in all events, one need only examine the alternative of
creating a federal bureaucracy to regulate insurance under the Title
III plan to conclude that in some instances the utilization of state
officials poses a lesser threat to principles of state sovereignty and
autonomy. This is so, irrespective of the ability of the federal government to compel a recalcitrant state to perform Title III functions.
Were such an action to be commenced, it would be within the
,power of the court to hand down an order which would allow the
opportunity to reconsider no-fault legislation. Finally, however, the
Congress could conclude that the failure of a single state or small
group of states to adopt or administer no-fault insurance plans is a
low price to pay for the greater good of inducing no-fault in most
of the states. This balancing is especially relevant in the face of the
design of the 1975 Title III plan, which, hopefully, Congress will have
the wisdom to reject.
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